TheJakartaPost.com - The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (THP) was signed in 2002 and came into force in November 2003. Indonesia, represented by the deputy state minister for the environment, signed the agreement in 2002. However, it will not be legally binding unless Indonesia ratifies the treaty.

Without Indonesia joining as a party, the treaty will lose its purest intention, that is to use national efforts and regional cooperation in preventing and monitoring transboundary haze pollution. Since Indonesia is the main source of the forest fires and the associated haze pollution, it seems to be reluctant to ratify the treaty.

The Office of the State Minister for the Environment has argued that the reason why the ratification process has been going very slowly is the complicated, bureaucratic procedure an international treaty has to undergo in order to be adopted as a legal instrument. The ratification and implementation of the agreement will require strong cross-departmental cooperation, involving at least four ministries: the Office of the State Minister for the Environment, Forestry Ministry, Agriculture Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministry. But the Office of the State Minister for the Environment should take the lead in the whole process.

According to Indonesian law, an international treaty has to be enacted as a law, which requires a long and tedious process of public hearings and meetings at the House of Representatives. The bill on the ratification of the ASEAN Agreement on THP was initially considered as one out of 78 bills the House would debate in 2006, but the legislative body later decided to drop it.

It is seen that environmental issues have never been on the main agenda of Indonesia's national policy. Although the problem of transboundary pollution is not only a national but also a regional concern, it still receives little attention from the decision makers. Indonesia is bogged down by other pressing priorities, such as terrorism, the oil price hike and subsidies, and other economic and social problems.

There is, however, a more fundamental problem as to why the bill is not considered urgent. Apart from the bureaucratic process and lack of infrastructure and budget, there is a general opinion among legislators and other important decision makers that the treaty will bring no clear benefits to Indonesia.

Indonesia appears to have the fear that the ratification will have some unclear implications. The first would be its implication on local regulations. It is likely that in the longer term, the treaty will develop as the problems also grow so that it might include enforcement and liability clauses. This will require Indonesia to adjust to it by applying more stringent regulations. For example, the existing Government Regulation No. 4/2001 on environmental degradation and/or pollution associated with forest/land fires would have to be amended by adding a clause on zero burning and controlled burning practices.

There should be a strict limitation on activities in peatland, which is prone to fires, to mention another example.

Learning from previous experience -- where there has been only one case heard in court for those violating Law No. 23/1997 on environmental management -- more efforts have to be spent to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the law. The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) and the Riau provincial administration have sued companies suspected of setting forest and land fires between 2003 and 2004, but all cases were dropped without clear reason.

Another implication is related to the private sector. Although the activities of land/forest utilization involve private operators, the treaty mainly deals with state obligations and not those of the private sector. Biased information, for example on the zero burning regulation, will likely lead to resistance from big timber and palm oil industries and logging concessionaires, who have turned out to be the main source of the latest land/forest fires.

Another important stakeholder to the agreement is the farmers and villagers, who use traditional slash and burn methods to open land for agricultural purposes. Banning such a practice will adversely effect their economy and may lead to more social unrest. It is important to note that -- based on the report from Eyes on the forest (www.eyesontheforest.or.id) -- the latest fires in Indonesia which occurred between July and August 2005 were mostly from big timber and oil palm plantations and logging concessions.

However, farmers and small landholders must have contributed to the fires somehow. The zero burning policy was adopted by ASEAN in 1999 to restrict -- but not necessarily ban completely -- the use of fires in land clearing. It is fair enough if the zero burning policy is applied to big oil palm, timber and rubber plantation companies, while farmers, villagers and small holders may be given the concession to allow them to use fire in a controllable manner.

Considering that zero burning techniques are only effective if applied on larger size plantations, farmers and villagers will not have to give up their current practice at all, but stricter control and monitoring measures should be applied in order to prevent fires from a small plantation from spreading to adjacent forests or larger plantations.

It is therefore unnecessary to ban the use of fire in small farms and plantations given that it is the only method farmers can afford, and in fact small fires are easier to control while the zero burning technique using machinery is not effective at all on small tracts of land.

A good example is the Malaysia's Environmental Quality Act, where open burning is prohibited on peat soils, swamp areas and for large-scale plantations, but is still allowed in areas of 20 hectares or less, as well as for certain activities including religious practices, training/research activities, disease control and shifting cultivation.

Meanwhile, the prejudice against the treaty is a result of a lack of understanding of the issues in the treaty. There has not been sufficient dissemination of information and a targeted approach toward government officials and members of the legislature dealing with the issue.

The pressure from other ASEAN member countries, who suffered from the haze in 1997/1998 and recently in August 2005, does not seem to be effective enough to push Indonesia to act rapidly. The government officials dealing with the issue should have a clear understanding that the haze problem is posing a threat, not only to the environment, but also to the economy of the region and the country.

More sound diplomatic persuasion from other ASEAN member countries is also needed. The role of ASEAN, as the governing body of the treaty is by no means unimportant. ASEAN should consider providing or raising the bulk of the resources for outreach activities. Or, will it need another dry season with fire and haze next year for us to take the necessary measures?

The writer is a visiting researcher with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). She can be reached at martha@siiaonline.org.